INTRODUCTION
Rural land is used for production and subsistence to satisfy immediate human needs for food, fuel and ecosystem services (DeFries et al. 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2003) .
However, as a result of economic development, technological progress, environmental change and policy and market forces, the total area of rural land is decreasing worldwide Verburg et al. 2008) . This inevitably raises the question of how to efficiently allocate the decreasing amount of rural land. Moreover, there are increasing divergences and conflicts on the allocation of rural land in many parts of the world, especially for populous countries such as China (Petit 2009; Williams and Schirmer 2012) . The scientific research on the changes in rural land cover and efficient rural land allocation has received increased attention since the 1990s because of prominent problems due to overuse of natural resources and environmental deterioration (Turner Ii et al. 1993; Qasim et al. 2013) . There is, however, lack of quantitive research on how to optimize the allocation of rural land comprehensively (Cocks and Ive 1996) , considering the different interests of various people, groups and organisations that have a stake in rural land use -so called stakeholders (Barker and Selman 1990; Rambonilaza and DacharyBernard 2007; Zeng and Edwards 2010; Yang et al. 2012; Pacione 2013) . Investigating the optimal allocation of rural land from the perspective of various stakeholders is necessary in light of the decrease of rural land and increasing divergences in rural land allocation. Therefore, this paper will start with identifying stakeholders and their interests in allocation of rural land, and employ empirical analysis to explore their individual and social optima that incoprorate their diverging preferences.
According to the stakeholder theory detailed by Freeman (1984) , stakeholders are any groups or individuals who can affect or are affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives. In the case of rural land allocation in China, the main stakeholders include rural households who are using and benefiting from the rural land directly, and public authorities who decide the macrolevel land use strategies. For example, several national programs have been introduced since the 1990s that attempt to steer rural land allocation in order to satisfy not only human needs for economic development but also the provision of ecosystem services. One of the main programs is the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP, also known as the 'Grain for Green' program), initiated by the Chinese national government in 2000 in order to convert sloping cropland into forest or grassland . Such national programs that are directed at ecological conservation, may constrain the economic activities of local residents, while the majority of rural households in China rely on rural land for their livelihoods and economic benefits (Liu and Lan 2015) . As such, the divergences of stakeholders on rural land allocation stem from the different extents of economic and ecological interests on rural land.
Divergences in allocation of rural land among stakeholders are particularly obvious in eco-fragile areas where ecological issues and widespread poverty are being confronted simultaneously (Ran et al., 2001) . This is reflected in the poor implementation and high supervision costs of ecoenvironmental policies, ecosystem deterioration and illegal grazing of livestock on natural grasslands by rural households. Protective use is urged by the society because the eco-fragile areas play a crucial role in the ecosystem of China, but productive use is decisive to the livelihoods of rural households. We, therefore, take a county located in the eco-fragile areas of Northern China as a case to investigate the divergences and potential optima of rural land allocation considering the ecological and economic benefits of various stakeholders.
In the existing literature, optimal allocation of land is mainly studied either from the macro perspective referring to the regional strategy (Verburg et al., 2013) , or aiming at local land use decisions at the rural household level (Kokoye et al., 2013) . However, the interests of allocation by different stakeholders have not been investigated jointly. Moreover, most research analysed land allocation based on remote sensing data (Turner Ii et al. 1994; Zhan et al. 2007 ) and discussed the driving forces of land allocation based on qualitative analysis, econometrics or game theory (e.g. Angelsen 2001; Kokoye et al., 2013) . Others have tried to determine an optimal landscape (Heijman and Mouche 2013) . This paper will explore the optimal allocation of rural land by considering representative stakeholders in the study area and by maximizing a social welfare function which considers the utility of the different stakeholders. This approach is in line with other studies that have modelled environmental problems through welfare analysis (Gerlagh and Keyzer 2004; Gerlagha and Keyzer 2003; Zhu 2004 ).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we present a conceptual framework of the process of rural land allocation to identify and categorize the stakeholders. Next, we derive the theoretical model starting with the utility function based on the preferences over desired rural land allocation for each stakeholder group, and then deducing the social welfare function considering the weights that are assigned to various stakeholder groups. In the empirical analysis, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to quantify preferences for each stakeholder group for different types of land; three social-economic scenarios are considered to measure the weight of each stakeholder group; and eventually the individual and social optima of rural land allocation are derived based on the estimated parameters of preference in the utility function and weights in the social welfare function. This paper concludes with a discussion on the divergences of individual optima and differences between current rural land allocation and the social optima.
It is hoped to provide some policy insights to regulate divergences of stakeholders in allocating rural land and achieve efficient allocation of rural land considering different stakeholders' ecological and economic benefits jointly.
CONCEPTAL FRAMEWORK
Both public authorities and rural households are identified as the stakeholders, because they can affect or are affected by the allocation of rural land. To further specify these stakeholders and understand their relationships, we employ the concept of the social-ecological system (SES) that was introduced by Ostrom (2007; to depict the process of rural land use allocation. The theory of SES is a diagnostic framework for the study of complex social-ecological system, considering the resource units, resource system, governance system and users as four core subsystems to link social, economic and regulatory settings and related ecosystems (Ostrom 2009 ). Figure 1 , based on Ostrom's SES framework, demonstrates the conceptual framework of our study. FIGURE 1. Schematic representation of rural land allocation process and relationships among stakeholders In the process of rural land allocation, the crucial resource unit is land, categorized as cultivated land, forest land, rangeland and other rural land 1 . The resource system is the system of rural land allocation. As defined by Ostrom (2009) , the governance system is represented by the rules and regulations set at the level of the government and other organizations to regulate the resource.
Hence, the governance system in our study is established by the public authorities that make and implement the rules to manage rural land allocation. Rural households, as the users of the rural land, are affected by these rules directly in terms of their land use decisions. These four core subsystems of the social-ecological system hereto present the linkages of social, economic and regulatory settings and related ecosystems in rural land allocation.
Considering that public authorities aim at economic development as well as ecological conservation in rural land allocation, they can be divided into public actors with an economic objective (economic authority) and public actors with an ecological objective (ecological authority). In fact, this is a simplified representation of reality which assumes that these public objectives can be separated. Rural households primarily focus on the economic benefits of rural land. However, some rural households may also pay attention to ecological benefits. For instance, herders who are solely dependent on the use of grasslands for livestock production have more awareness of grassland conservation than farmers who engage in both crop production and animal husbandry. As such, we divide the rural households into farmers and herders. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The above conceptual framework is formalized into the theoretical model based on welfare economics in this section. It involves the individual optima to maximize each stakeholder group's benefits and social optima to maximize all stakeholders' benefits as a whole. The former aims to explore the divergences of rural land use between stakeholder groups, and the latter is to investigate the efficient rural land allocation.
According to the theory of welfare economics, different agents have different demands on the consumption of various goods/services. This has led to the study of individual utility and social welfare optimisation for combinations of different goods characteristics (Heijman and Mouche 2013; Perman et al. 2011 ). In the process of rural land allocation, we consider the hypothetical society consisting of four individuals and four goods, that is, four stakeholder groups (herders, farmers, ecological public authority and economic public authority) and the four types of rural land (cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land). These four stakeholder groups derive utility from combined using the four types of land. In addition, a Cobb-Douglas form of utility function has been applied to study the optimal consumption, leisure, investment and voluntary retirement problem for an agent (e.g. Koo et al. 2013) , and discuss the trade-off between goods and leisure of workers (e.g. Train and McFadden 1978) . This paper hereby employs Cobb-Douglas utility function to represent individual utility and social welfare.
Utility function of each stakeholder group
Assuming that the economic and ecological interests of stakeholders on rural land are demonstrated by their preference on the four types of rural land. And then their utility function in the Cobb-Douglas form is:
where = 1, 2, 3 4 represent the four stakeholder groups: herders, farmers, ecological public authority and economic public authority, respectively. U i indicates the obtained utility of stakeholder group i in allocation of rural land. ( ) , ( ) , ( ) and ℎ( ) denote the area of four types of rural land that are allocated by stakeholder group i, and they are cultivated land area, rangeland area, forest land area and other rural land area, respectively. , , represent stakeholder group i's preference over four types of rural land. Remarkably, the land constraint needs to be met, presented as follows:
where L is the total area of the rural land. Equation [2] illustrates that the sum of the cultivated land, rangeland, forest land and other rural land that are allocated equals the total area of rural land. Moreover, the area of each type of rural land is not negative. The preference of each stakeholder group over four types of rural land is not negative and their sum is 1.
Further, the individual optima is able to be derived through the utility function. As suggested, the allocation of land may achieve the optimum when the aggregate interests from its various uses are maximized (Lopez et al. 1994 ). Thus, we maximise the utility function of each stakeholder group to reveal the individual optima of rural land allocation. With the help of the Lagrange optimisation procedure, this gives (see Annex A for the detailed derivation):
[6]
are the resulting individual optima of stakeholder group i in allocation of rural land, indicating the individually rational optimum depending on the preference of stakeholder group i for the different types of rural land and taking into account land constraint.
Social welfare function
Bergson and Samuelson introduced the social welfare function, which sums up the utility functions of all the individuals in the society (Pollak 1979) . We assumed that the four stakeholder groups represent all of the social agents of rural land allocation, therefore our social welfare function is presented by the weighted sum of the four stakeholder groups' utilities, subject to the land constraint. Thus, the Cobb-Douglas form of the social welfare function is:
subject to:
with
where = 1, 2, 3 4 represent our four stakeholder groups. W is the social welfare of rural land allocation that equals to the weighted sum of the four stakeholder groups' utilities. is the obtained utility by stakeholder group i. is the weight of stakeholder group i in the process of rural land allocation.
( ) are the areas of cultivated land, rangeland, forestland and other rural land considering social welfare. The constraints are the area sum of four types of rural land equals to the total area of rural land, and each of them is not negative. The total weights of four stakeholder groups on rural land allocation are 1 and no one is negative.
To reveal the social optima of rural land allocation, we maximise the social welfare function.
With the help of the Lagrange optimisation procedure, this gives (see Annex B for the detailed derivation):
[10]
[12]
are the resulting social optima of rural land allocation, which illustrate the optimum for social welfare considering the preference of each stakeholder group on four types of rural land and their weights in the process of rural land allocation.
RESEARCH REGION AND DATA COLLECTION

4.1.Research region
The empirical application of the theoretical model will focus on the case of Tai Pusi County. Tai Pusi County is located in the eco-fragile areas of northern China and faces both economic backwardness and ecological degradation (Chen et al., 2007) . Its total population is 211,146, and there are 171,500 and 39,646 residents living in rural and urban areas, respectively. Rural residents include 168,514 farmers and 2,986 herders. Tai Pusi County's total area measures 341,473 hectares, including 322,100 hectares of rural land, 14,613 hectares of urban and industrial land and 4,760 hectares of unused land. Since it is on the southern edge of Otindag Sandy Land, the nearest crucial sand source of sandstorms in Beijing, it plays a significant role in preventing sandstorms from reaching Beijing. A series of eco-environmental policies with restraints on rural land use have been introduced by the public authorities to protect the vulnerable ecosystem here. On the other hand, Tai Pusi county is one of the poverty-stricken counties of China and two thirds of local rural households' income is derived from agricultural production relying on the use of rural land. As such, an efficient rural land allocation is indispensable concerning not only its ecological importance but also the local households' livelihoods. It has seven townships and includes pasture area and agricultural area. In the pasture area, where the herders are living, the local livelihoods depend primarily on grazing and very few herders engage in crop farming. The farmers living in the agricultural area are involved in both crop farming and livestock breeding. The latter is merely allowed with barn breeding by ecological authorities through eco-environmental regulations. In recent years, with increasing population and continuing ecological deterioration, divergences in allocation of rural land among local farmers, herders and public authorities have intensified.
Data collection
Individual interviews with representatives of each of the four stakeholder groups that were identified in section II were conducted to assess the groups' preferences over four types of rural land. In our survey, 15 herders, 15 farmers, 6 officers of economic authority and 6 officers of ecological authority were interviewed. Herders and farmers were selected considering their different income levels and sufficient knowledge about rural land allocation. The public officers are key informants of rural land allocation strategy about their affiliated public authorities. It is noted that 30 public authorities are in charge of local affairs in Tai Pusi County. The Local Finance Bureau and the Farming and Grazing Bureau were selected as the representatives of economic authority which pay more attention to local economic development than other public authorities. Moreover, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Forestry Bureau aim at ecological conservation and represent the ecological authority. The interviewees were firstly noted to represent their groups' benefits, and then scored their interests on the ecological benefit and economic benefit of rural land. Specifically, the interviewees translated their preferences on four types of rural land into pairwise comparisons given a criterion (ecological benefit or economic benefit) (see Annex C for the detailed questionnaires). The interview procedure and content are based on the theory of Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which will be further described in next section.
Besides the individual interviews, additional data on social-economic indicators is based on statistical information collected by local governments. This includes data on population, income, public expenditure on economic development and ecological conservation.
Data description on actual rural land allocation
Before we investigate the optimal rural land allocation, the actual change of rural land allocation in Tai Pusi County from 1995 to 2012 is described in figure 3. interests. This will then be compared with the actual land use allocation.
Estimation of the model parameters
Stakeholders' preference ( , , , )
Based on the individual interviews, the stakeholders' preference on rural land allocation presented by , , in our conceptual model, is evaluated through Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The AHP method was introduced by Thomas Saaty (1980) as one of the most effective tools for dealing with complex decision-making. Numerous studies in different fields have used AHP, such as planning, resource allocation, conflict/divergence resolution and optimisation (Vaidya and Kumar 2006) . AHP includes two phases: hierarchic design and evaluation (Vargas 1990 ). In the design phase, the problem is structured in a hierarchical model descending from an overall goal to criteria and alternatives in successive levels (Saaty 1990 ).
Based on our research target, iterative interviews with interviewees led to a consensus on the hierarchic design, as presented in figure 4 . We expect each stakeholder group's interests in rural land use are as follows: farmers mostly prefer cultivated land for its economic benefits of agricultural production; herders mostly prefer rangeland for its economic benefits of livestock production; ecological authority, who takes the responsibility of protecting the ecosystem on behalf of the ecological target of national government and ecological demands of the society, prefers the forest land and rangeland for their more ecological benefits than other two types of rural land; and economic authority, who aims at developing local economy, prefers the cultivated land and rangeland for their economic benefits.
The numerical value of preference in table 1 is consistent with these assumption. That is, herders have the highest preference for rangeland (0.5286); farmers prefer cultivated land (0.4317) and then rangeland (0.2695); ecological authority has more interest in forest land (0.3746) and rangeland (0.3173); and economic authority has more interest in cultivated land (0.4304) and rangeland (0.3133). The degree of divergences on rural land allocation among stakeholders is shown in table 1 through the differences of stakeholder groups' preference on the four types of rural land.
Weights for stakeholders in the social welfare function ( )
Weights that are assigned to the stakeholders in the social welfare function are quantified in three social-economic scenarios.
Scenario 1: we assume that the weight of each stakeholder group in allocation of rural land is the same, i.e. 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 1/4. Scenario 2: we assume that the weight of each stakeholder group in allocation of rural land is determined by income distribution. That is, β i is the income share of stakeholder group i in total stakeholder groups' income. This weight is considered as the Negishi weight (Negishi, 1972) . Zhu and van Ierland (2006) showed that the Negishi weight is the income share of each region in the total economy if the Cobb-Douglas utility function is used.
In this study, the income of stakeholder groups in 2012 was measured as follows: the total income of the farmers is the population of farmers multiplied by the annual net income of each farmer in 2012; the total income of the herders is the population of herders multiplied by the annual net income of each herder in 2012; the eco-environmental expenditure on rural land is regarded as a proxy income of ecological authority from the rural land, assuming that the ecological authority balances its real income and expenditure; and the economic expenditure on rural land is regarded as a proxy income of economic authority from the rural land, assuming that the economic authority balances its real income and expenditure. Scenario 3: we assume that the weight of each stakeholder group in allocation of rural land is determined by labour force distribution. That is, β i is the labour force share of stakeholder group i in total stakeholder groups' labour force in 2012. The weight of each stakeholder group in allocating rural land ( ) is shown in Table 2 in three scenarios (see Annex D for more details). 
Individual optima in allocation of rural land
According to the individual preferences of each stakeholder group on the four types of rural land (see table 1 ) and the maximised forms of stakeholder utility function (equation (3), (4), (5) and (6)), we obtain the individual optima of each stakeholder group on rural land allocation.
Moreover, the total rural land area of Tai Pusi county in 2012 is used as the land constraint that is the available rural land area for allocating (322.3 hectares). The results of individual optima and actual allocation of rural land in 2012 are presented as follows:
TABLE 3 Individual optima of each stakeholder group and actual allocation of rural land in 2012
The results in Table 3 but less rangeland (86.9); ecological authority prefers more forest land (120.7) and other rural land (30.9), but less cultivated land (68.4) and rangeland (102.3); and economic authority prefers more cultivated land (138.7) and other rural land (45.4), but less rangeland land (101.0) and forest land (37.2). In short, the actual rural land allocation does not correspond with any of these four stakeholder groups' individual optima, and these individual optima are different from each other. Table 3 shows the degree of divergences in allocation of rural land among stakeholders.
Social optima in allocation of rural land
The divergences among stakeholders can be possibly solved by the tradeoff of stakeholders' benefits on rural land, i.e. the social optima of rural land allocation. According to the weight of each stakeholder group in three social-economic scenarios (see table 2) and the maximised forms of social welfare function (equation (9), (10), (11) and (12) In addition, different scenarios provide different social optima for the allocation of rural land, but there are no big differences among the three scenarios, especially not between secnario 2 and 3.
The largest part of rural land is expected to be allocated as cultivated land if the allocating weights depend on the income distribution (scenario 2) or labour force distribution (scenario 3).
But the largest part of rural land is expected to be allocated as rangeland if we assume equal weight to every stakeholder group (scenario 1). Scenarios 2 and 3 provide the same order for the four types of rural land allocation, but they are different from the order for actual allocation. It indicates that the actual allocation might not meet the social-economic requirements on how to allocate the rural land, which could be considered as the reason of divergences of rural land allocation. For cultivated land, actual allocation and all of the individual optima are out of the range of social optima. Herders and the ecological authority expect to allocate less cultivated land than social optima, while farmers and the economic authority expect to allocate more cultivated land than social optima. Actual allocation needs to increase cultivated land area to go into the range of social optima. For rangeland, the optima of ecological and economic authorities are within the range of social optima, but the optima of herders and farmers are not. Herders expect to allocate more rangeland than in the social optima, but farmers expect to allocate less rangeland than in the social optima. Actual allocation needs to decrease rangeland area to go into the range of the social optima. For forest land, actual allocation is within the range of the social optima. However, farmers and the ecological authority expect to allocate more forest land than in the social optima, while herders and the economic authority expect to allocate less forest land than in the social optima. For other rural land, i.e., land that is used for raising animals, agricultural facilities and agricultural roads, the optima of herders and ecological authority are within the range of the social optima, but the optima of farmers and economic authority are not. Farmers expect to allocate less other rural land than in the social optima, but economic authority expects to allocate more other rural land than in the social optima. Actual allocation needs to increase other rural land area to go into the range of social optima. In short, table 5 presents the degree of divergences of individual optima and the differences among individual optima, social optima and actual allocation of rural land.
Comparison of individual optima, social optima and actual allocation of rural land
CONCLUSION
This paper takes a welfare economics perspective to investigate the divergences of individual optima among stakeholders and social optima in allocation of rural land, combining the interests of public authorities and rural households on rural land allocation. The social-ecological system approach introduced by Ostrom (2007; is employed to identify stakeholders and categorize them into four groups: herders, farmers, ecological authority and economic authority. AHP is used to quantify the preference of four stakeholder groups on the four types of rural land: cultivated, range, forest and other. And three social-economic scenarios are used to measure the weights of four stakeholder groups in the process of allocation of rural land. Tai Pusy county, located in the eco-fragile areas of Northern China, is studied as a case to present the empirical analysis. Our results reveal the specific degree of divergences of individual optima and the differences among individual optima, social optima and actual allocation of rural land in our case.
We find that a social optimum of rural land allocation would require a shift towards more cultivated land, more other rural land, and less rangeland, compared with the actual rural land allocation in 2012. And only the forest land area was in the range of the social optimum in 2012.
These results should be put in the Chinese policy context. Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has shown increased interest in extending the area of forest land and rangeland for ecosystem protection purposes. Programs such as the SLCP that aim to convert sloping cropland into forestland or grassland are witness to this policy direction . However, our results show that the social optima of rural land allocation requires conversion in the other direction: from grasslands towards cultivated land, while the area of forest land is already within the range of social optima. The preference for cultivated land over rangeland may be driven by the policy restrictions on rangeland. For instance, the policies of grazing bans or seasonal grazing for ecological conservation restrict the econimic benefits of grassland (Li et al., 2007; Dorji et al., 2010) . In this case, farmers can use cultivated land more freely than rangeland. While the insight of increasing cultivated land instead of rangeland might seem controversial in view of the current policy context, our results could also be driven by the overall pressure on rural land, and limited cultivated land in particular, in China. This pressure is likely to be especially strong in the ecofragile areas where most of the local residents depend on farming, but where agricultural productivity falls far behind the national average level. This promotes the demand for more cultivated land. With respect to the demand of more other rural land, it reflects that the rural area of China lacks of the land used for raising animals, agricultural facilities, agricultural roads and irrigation. Furthermore, our results may also reflect the misalignment between preferences of the national government -as included in the national policy programs that focus on environmental protection -and preferences of local governments -whose performance evaluation is based primarily on economic growth indicators (Liu & Diamond, 2005) .
Finally, we would like to point out a number of limitations of our research. While the research method is generic and likely to be valid for other regions facing land use divergences, the specific outcomes presented in this paper are based on stakeholder interviews in one Chinese county and are therefore not generalizable. Furthermore, the application of the model includes only 4 different categories of rural land, 4 stakeholder groups and 3 senarios, which is a simplification of reality. 
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The logarithmic transformation of the utility function gives:
The Lagrange function is then:
Taking the partial derivations of with respect to each variable, and setting the first order condition gives: 
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This completes the proof of equation (3) to (6) 
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